Country: Russia

Years: 1945-1952

Leader: Josef Vissarionovich Stalin

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party as AUCP, or Communist Party. Encyclopedia Britannica (2018) identifies the Communist Party’s ideology as leftist: “A few months after coming to power the new Russian regime initiated a series of unprecedented measures intended to destroy all vestiges of [private property](https://www.britannica.com/topic/private-property) and inaugurate a centralized communist economy.” Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as leftist. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Stalin’s ideology as leftist. Lentz (1994: 781) identifies Stalin’s ideology as leftist, writing “Stalin subsequently supported Lenin and the Bolsheviks” and that he “was active in the October Revolution that resulted in the Communists taking over the government”. In V-Party (2020), 6 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Far-left” (-4.214) in 1970.

Years: 1953-1963

Leader: Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev

Ideology: left

Description: CHISOLS identifies Khrushchev’s party as CPSU. DPI identifies CPSU’s ideology as leftist. Political Handbook of the World does not provide any information on the CPSU’s ideology. Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as leftist. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Khrushchev’s ideology as leftist. Lentz (1994: 782) identifies Khrushchev’s ideology as leftist, writing that “after the Bolshevik Revolution, Khrushchev joined the Communist party and fought in the Red Army”. In V-Party (2020), 6 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Far-left” (-4.214) in 1970.

Years: 1964-1981

Leader: Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev

Ideology: left

Description: CHISOLS identifies Brezhnev’s party as CPSU. Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as leftist. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Brezhnev’s ideology as leftist. Lentz (1994: 784) identifies Brezhnev’s ideology as leftist, writing that “he resigned as chairman on July 15, 1964, to become more active in the Communist party activities”. In V-Party (2020), 6 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Far-left” (-4.214) in 1970, “Far-left” (-4.214) in 1974, and “Far-left” (-4.214) in 1979.

Years: 1982-1983

Leader: Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov

Ideology: left

Description: CHISOLS identifies Andropov’s party as CPSU. Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as leftist. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Andropov’s ideology as leftist. Lentz (1994: 784) identifies Andropov’s ideology as leftist, writing that “he remained active in [communist] party organizations and was named party secretary in Karelia in 1947”. In V-Party (2020), 6 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Far-left” (-4.214) in 1979.

Years: 1984

Leader: Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko

Ideology: left

Description: CHISOLS identifies Chernenko’s party as CPSU. Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as leftist. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Chernenko’s ideology as leftist. Lentz (1994: 785) identifies Chernenko’s ideology as leftist, writing that “[Chernenko] was promoted to the position of chief ideologist for the Communist party in January of 1982”. In V-Party (2020), 6 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Far-left” (-4.214) in 1984.

Years: 1985-1990

Leader: Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev

Ideology: left

Description: CHISOLS identifies Gorbachev’s party as CPSU. Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as leftist. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Gorbachev’s ideology as leftist. Lentz (1994: 786) writes that “[Gorbachev] was criticized by the left from moving too slowly with his reforms and was threatened by the right for moving too far away from Communist orthodoxy”. In V-Party (2020), 6 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Far-left” (-4.214) in 1984 and “Far-left” (-4.214) in 1989.

Years: 1991-1999

Leader: Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin

Ideology: right

Description: CHISOLS identifies Yeltsin’s party as none. Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as rightist. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Yeltsin’s ideology as centrist. Lentz (1994: 664) writes that “Yeltsin began acting independently of the Soviet government and banned the Communist party in Russia”.

Years: 2000-2020

Leader: Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin

Ideology: rightist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies Putin as non-party. World Statesmen (2019) identifies Putin as non-party until 2008, and as Yedinaya Rossiya (United Russia/YR) afterwards. Manzano (2017) identifies Putin’s ideology as rightist. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Putin’s ideology as rightist. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 16 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of United Russia (ER) as 3.5. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) identify United Russia’s oppose-support market score as 5 and its support-oppose welfare score as approximately 4.5 on scales from 1-7. Saunders and Strukov (2010: 603) identifies United Russia as centrist, writing that “the platform is centrist, conservative, and patriotic,” that “United Russia opposes radicalism on the right and left,” and that “it supports anti-corruption measures, increased military spending, improved social welfare, streamlining of government functions, and the elevation of Russia’s standing as a world power.” Hass (2003: 1138) writes that “with the emergence of Putin, the centrist juggernaut United Russia has come to dominate the political scene to the detriment of right-wing and left-wing par-ties. This move to the center is less a sign of emerging political moderation among the population—nationalist pride persists, as does some desire for welfare support—than it is a sign of the increasing power of the Kremlin and Putin’s technocratic, less ideological stance.” Sakwa (2013: 43) writes that “The genesis of the party of power also affected its lack of ideology … UR openly and deliberately manifested its loyalty to Russia’s political regime and Putin personally, while its position on major policy issues remained vague and indefinite.” They also write that “it is located near the zero point on the left-right continuum between pro-statist and pro-market parties”. Winning (2013) writes that “the ruling United Russia party has founded a “liberal” platform calling for a major overhaul of the party in light of heightened political competition. … The party published a manifesto late Monday positing that it alone could solve the country’s most pressing social and economic problems, arguing that the state should play a guiding role in the economy and calling on national media to focus on unifying the population. … Independent analysts said the manifesto’s overriding aim was to discredit Kremlin critics, and they described its vision for Russia’s future as broadly conservative.” Remington (2015: 176) writes that “United Russia considers itself to be centrist. … At the same time, it does have a programmatic tendency. Sometimes it calls itself ‘right-centrist,’ because it supports market-oriented and pro-business policies, such as cutting taxes and reducing regulation. Often it calls its philosophy ‘social conservatism.’ Voters see the party as positioned on the right side of the spectrum – three quarters of citizens believe that United Russia wants to ‘continue and deepen market reforms.’” Weir, (2000) writes, “President Vladimir Putin spelled out his vision for Russia’s future last weekend—and to the surprise of many, it combined the most liberal economic agenda to appear since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was a frankly authoritarian blueprint for the revival of state power. ‘Putin expressed the new economic ideology that Russia will follow, and that is freedom,’ said Leonid Grigoriev, director of the Economic Analysis Bureau, a Kremlin-connected think-tank. . . The six economic guidelines Mr. Putin laid out were commitments to protect private property rights, slash subsidies to unprofitable industries, streamline the state bureaucracy, cut taxes and tariffs, reform the banking sector and end welfare assistance to all but the poorest Russians. Those principles are likely to trigger sharp political conflicts and widespread social discontent. . . ‘Only an effective and democratic state is capable of protecting civic, political and economic freedoms,’ [Putin] said. . . ‘Basically, Putin is talking about the old Russian model of undivided authority and autocracy,’ said Lilia Shevtsova, an expert with the Carnegie Endowment in Moscow. ‘In other words, in order for the state to operate effectively everyone needs to line up and carry out the orders coming from the top.’” Eltchaninoff (2019) writes, “Vladimir Putin is first and foremost offering a brutal diagnosis of the world since the end of the Cold War: a world of Western domination, which he views as both hypocritical and unjust. In his interview with the Financial Times, the Russian president referred to this ideological, political and economic hegemony as "the liberal idea", declaring that it had become "obsolete". As such, he is not only targeting economic liberalism - an ideology which, after all, he himself pursues in Russia - but also political liberalism: a system based on the rights of individuals and civil society. . . To understand what Putin thinks and wants, it is essential to grasp what he means by "liberal": that is, individuals who have been "Westernised". In other words, they have been "zombified" by the idea of human rights, by an openmindedness to "the other", and by mass consumption. . . According to Putin, all the world's recent problems originate with the "liberal idea". . . the West's blind approval of globalised economic liberalism, a system that enriches only a minority of the population. . . To Putin, the rise of populism is proof of the validity of his global analysis: he believes nationalist and authoritarian regimes, based on "tradition", will eventually supplant democracies based on individual rights. For this reason, he encourages any actions or words that bring disruption to the liberal world.” In V-Party (2020), 6 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Center” (0.215) in 2007, “Center” (0.215) in 2011, and “Center” (0.041) in 2016. DPI identifies United Russia as centrist.

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